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Implicit memory reflects itself on situations in which previously acquired 
information is expressed, without awareness or intention. The study of 
implicit memory has had a profound impact on how researchers have 
investigated the human memory. In this paper, we review the main studies 
which have revealed dissociations between direct and indirect tests of 
memory, and address the two main theoretical approaches used to explain 
these dissociations: the processing view and the multiple systems view. We 
then describe recent neuroscience studies and discuss its contributions to 
help clarify the debate about the mechanisms involved in explicit and 
implicit memory. Finally, we critically analyze some questions and 
controversies surrounding this literature, such as (a) the transparency 
assumption and the contamination issue; and (b) the theoretical utility of the 
dissociations. We emphasize that the biggest challenge for future research is 
to develop comprehensive theories that integrate behavioral and 
neuroscience findings.  
 
 
The memory of a past event can influence our subsequent behavior, 
even on the absence of explicit recall of that episode. This type of memory 
is called “implicit memory”. The emergence of the study on implicit 
memory definitely impacted the literature about human memory. Some 
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authors go as far as to say that this research has constituted a true scientific 
revolution – a paradigm shift – due to the innovative way researchers 
started measuring and interpreting the influence past events have on present 
experience (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Schacter, Chiu, & 
Oschsner, 1993). Human memory stopped being studied as equivalent to 
explicit recall ability, instead encompassing every past influence on present 
performance. 
The implicit memory construct overlaps with various concepts 
employed by previous generations of psychologists, namely by 
psychoanalysts (for a historical approach, see Schacter, 1987). The notion 
that there are mental contents which, even if not consciously accessed, 
influence our behavior, has long been a topic of debate amongst 
philosophers, neurologists, and psychologists. Nevertheless, the research on 
cognition initiated in the 80s (Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) has 
brought along methodologies which have made possible an experimental 
approach to the problem. It is understandable, therefore, the outburst of 
studies which have since addressed the issue. This approach allowed 
researchers to study the unconscious aspects of memory, under controlled 
laboratory conditions.   
 In the present paper our goal is to review the studies that revealed 
dissociations between direct and indirect memory tests and to analyze how 
subsequent developments in this literature have helped to clarify the nature 
of the processes underlying explicit and implicit memory, both at the 
psychological and at the physiological levels. We will begin by describing 
the seminal studies showing the aforementioned dissociations. Next, we will 
contrast the two main theoretical approaches used to explain those 
dissociations: the processing view and the multiple systems view, and 
address the ability of both theories to explain the extant data. Then, we will 
review recent neuroscience findings and discuss the possibility of an 
integrative approach. Lastly, we will address some fundamental questions 
and controversies which remain unsettled in the literature. 
 
What is Implicit Memory? 
The implicit memory literature is based upon the distinction between 
two forms of memory retrieval from long-term memory, on the one hand 
the explicit memory and, on the other hand, the implicit memory (Graf & 
Schacter, 1985, 1987). Explicit memory refers to the conscious and 
intentional retrieval of previously experienced information. This form of 
memory is typically studied through free recall, recognition, and cued recall 
traditional tests. Psychologists interested in memory phenomena have long 
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used this type of memory tests almost exclusively so as to develop their 
theories. 
Implicit memory, on the other hand, manifests itself in situations in 
which past experiences influence present task performance, although 
participants are not instructed in any way to recall those experiences (see 
Lewandowsky, Dunn, & Kirsner, 1989; Reder, 2014). In this case, 
participants are normally asked to complete a given task, without any 
reference to the previous episode. As a way of studying this type of 
memory, indirect or implicit tests have been utilized, such as: word-
fragment completion (in which participants have to complete word 
fragments with the first word which comes to mind, e.g., PE_C_L for 
Pencil); word stem completion (in which participants are shown the first 
three letters of a word and they have to, similarly to the previous test, 
complete the fragments in order to form a word, e.g., PEN_ _ _); and 
perceptual identification (in which words are briefly presented and 
participants are asked to try to identify them). It is said that implicit 
memory effects occur when there is a greater likelihood of participants 
completing the word fragments with words presented previously, or of 
identifying with greater acuteness and swiftness previously studied words, 
when compared to words which were not shown before. Often, the terms 
implicit memory and priming are used interchangeably (Tulving & 
Schacter, 1990) as a way of referring to the transfer, or priming, from 
previously presented stimuli on subsequent tests which do not involve 
conscious recollection.  
 
Dissociations between direct and indirect tests 
The resurgence of attention to the implicit aspects of memory had, as 
an initial driving force, an influx of studies which revealed dissociations 
between the results obtained with direct and indirect memory tests1. A lot of 
these dissociations were reported in neuropsychological studies with 
amnesiac patients (for a review, see Shimamura, 1986). Amnesiac patients 
are typically described as people who, as a result of a brain deficit, become 
incapable of storing new verbal information in long-term memory, although 
                                                
1 In this paper, we opted for employing the terms direct and indirect for these two types of 
tests. As several authors point out (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Richardson-
Klavehn, Gardiner, & Java, 1996), employing the terms “explicit test” and “implicit tests” 
to refer to them erroneously suggests an equivalence between tasks and processes (Jacoby, 
1991). 
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their other cognitive functions remain relatively intact, such as language or 
intelligence (Cohen & Squire, 1980).  
On a series of studies which has since become classic, Warrington and 
Weiskrantz (1968, 1970, 1974) observed that amnesiacs, after studying a set 
of words, exhibited similar priming effects as the non-clinical group in 
indirect tests of partial information (i.e., picture completion, word-fragment 
completion and word-stem completion), although they revealed a severely 
weakened performance in direct memory tests (recall and recognition tests). 
These studies clearly showed that memory can manifest itself in the absence 
of awareness. Patients reported not recalling the previously presented 
words, but their performance reflected memory ability. These results led to 
two important consequences. First, they revealed that, contrary to what was 
typically assumed, amnesiac patients are able to retain new verbal 
information, and that can be detected, as long as indirect memory measures 
are used. Second, a hypothesis started to form that indirect and direct 
memory tests recruit different mental systems or processes which act in a 
relatively independent way. 
Other studies have shown that similar dissociations could be obtained 
in populations without brain lesions (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby, 1983). 
For instance, Jacoby and Dallas (1981, Study 1) manipulated the processing 
levels (semantic vs perceptual), and obtained the typical effect in a 
recognition test (Craik & Lockhart, 1972).  In other words, a better 
recognition of words presented after a semantic encoding than after a 
perceptual encoding. Nevertheless, the performance on the perceptual 
identification test was similar, irrespective of the processing level according 
to which the words were initially coded. Subsequent studies have 
demonstrated that the level of processing does not interfere with the priming 
effects of other indirect tests, such as fragment completion tests (Srinivas & 
Roediger, 1990), and word-stem completion tests (Graf & Mandler, 1984, 
Graf, Mandler, & Haden, 1982). 
In a different study, Jacoby (1983) created three conditions in which 
the participants: (1) read a word without any context (e.g., xxx – cold); (2) 
read the same word in a relevant context (e.g., hot – cold); or (3) generated 
that word from the context (e.g., hot - ???). Results demonstrated that 
generated words are better recognized than words read in a relevant context 
and that these, in turn, are better recognized than words read without any 
context. This pattern reflects a robust effect in the literature – the generation 
effect (Slamecka & Graf, 1978), according to which words that are 
generated are better recalled than words which are simply read. However, 
the opposite pattern was observed in the perceptual identification test. In 
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this case, participants identified words which had been previously read 
without any context more easily than words which had been read within a 
context or generated, respectively. Therefore, although the generation effect 
is considered a classic effect in the memory literature, its occurrence is 
contingent upon the memory test used, and the opposite pattern can be 
obtained, as long as an indirect memory test is employed. The fact that the 
same variable has opposite effects on the two types of tests, direct and 
indirect, suggests once again that the processes involved in the performance 
on one of the tasks are probably not involved in the performance pertaining 
to the other task. 
A different type of a commonly found dissociation involves the 
manipulation of the modality of word presentation. It was shown that 
altering such modality from the study phase (e.g., auditory) to the test phase 
(e.g., visual) drastically mitigated the priming effects in various indirect 
memory tests: perceptual identification (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & 
Witherspoon, 1982), word-stem completion (Blaxton, 1989; Graf, 
Shimamura, & Squire, 1985), lexical decision (Kirsner, Milech, & Standen, 
1983; Kirsner & Smith, 1974), and anagram solution (McAndrews & 
Moscovitch, 1990). Nevertheless, the performance in direct tests of free 
recall and recognition doesn’t tend to be affected by the change in modality. 
On balance, the described dissociations lend support to the notion that 
explicit and implicit memory operate according to different principles. 
Some variables affect only the direct tests, whereas others affect only the 
indirect tests. 
In theoretical terms, the explanation of the dissociations found 
between different types of memory tests is something which has aroused 
interest among researchers. An initial explanation was that indirect tests 
were less dependent upon the strength of memory trait activation. The same 
traits would not be strong enough to influence the performance on direct 
tests. Nonetheless, this explanation was soon discarded as it was 
incompatible with the existence of manipulations which affected direct tests 
without affecting the performance on indirect tests (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981). Since then, two main theoretical views have competed for an 
explanation of the obtained dissociations: on the one hand, the views which 
explain the dissociations by postulating the existence of different memory 
systems and, on the other hand, the views which attempt to explain the 
dissociations based on the functioning of different processes. 
 
 
 
 T. Ramos, et al. 370
The Systems versus Processes debate 
The debate (Kelley & Lindsay, 1996; Roediger, Buckner, & 
McDermott, 1999; Toth & Hunt, 1999) between the system approaches and 
the process approaches reflects a long-standing controversy between two 
meta-theoretical assumptions regarding the study of the human mind: 
structuralism and functionalism. The tension between these approaches has 
always been present in psychology and philosophy of the mind alike, and it 
is possible to trace its origins back to the beginning of psychology as a 
science (regarding this debate, see Roediger, Gallo, & Geraci, 2002; Toth & 
Hunt, 1999). Within these conceptions of the mind, structuralism argues 
that psychological processes, such as perception or memory, should be seen 
as separate phenomena. The main goal is thus to analyze the modular 
structure, or basic units (Fodor, 1983) of the human mind. On the other 
hand, functionalism rejects such mental morphology, arguing that the 
various processes operate in an integrative manner. Hence, instead of 
analyzing the structure, functionalists stress that an adequate approach to 
mental life should focus on trying to understand how the mind works. In 
other words, instead of emphasizing what the mental processes are and 
where they are located, functionalists emphasize what they do, and how 
they do it. In current research, structuralism tends to be associated with the 
neuroscience approach. Neuroimaging and neuropsychological methods are 
typically used within this approach in order to locate specific mental 
functions in the brain. Functionalists, on the other hand, tend to embrace a 
cognitive approach which makes use of data from behavioral studies in 
order to derive mentalistic information processing theories (Tulving, 1999).  
In the context of memory theories, structuralism is closer to the multiple 
systems approach, whereas functionalism reflects itself upon the processing 
memory theories.  
Squire’s theory (e.g., Squire, 1987; Squire, 1992) is a representative 
framework of the view which postulates the existence of different memory 
systems. According to Squire, systems ”can be distinguished in terms of the 
kinds of information they process, the principles by which they operate, and 
the brain structures and connections that support them” (Squire, 2007, p. 
343; see also Schacter & Tulving, 1994). Squire distinguished between a 
declarative memory system (described as “knowing that”) and a non-
declarative system (described as “knowing how”). In broader terms, it is 
assumed that the declarative system is responsible for the performance on 
explicit tests, while the non-declarative memory system underlies various 
phenomena, including classical conditioning, the learning of motor skills, 
and priming effects. According to this view, amnesiac patients would have 
an impaired declarative system, and a relatively intact non-declarative 
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system. With regard to the normal population, the case would be that 
several variables would affect a system, while other variables would affect 
the other, which would explain the previously described dissociations. In 
fact, since it is assumed that the systems are highly independent, the 
dissociations are not only explicable, but expected. 
The alternative account, instead of assuming that implicit and explicit 
tests rely upon different memory systems, is based on the assumption that 
different tests require the operation of different mental processes, and thus 
require different types of information. Since in the literature dissociations 
between different explicit tests (e.g., between recall and recognition, see 
MacLeod & Kampe, 1996) are also known, the notion here is that 
explanatory principles, similar to the ones employed to understand those 
dissociations, can also explain the dissociations between indirect and direct 
tests. One of the fundamental ideas of this framework is that the differences 
between memory tests can only be comprehended by explaining the 
relationship between the processes which occur during encoding and the 
processes which occur during retrieval. This idea is particularly developed 
in the transfer-appropriate procedures approach (TAP; Weldon, Roediger, 
& Challis, 1989; Roediger et al., 1999; Roediger et al., 2002). The main 
tenet of the TAP is that memory performance is benefitted when the 
cognitive operations which take place during the test recapitulate the ones 
which occurred during learning. 
According to the TAP approach, implicit and explicit tests require 
different operations and access to different forms of information, therefore 
benefitting from different types of processing during learning. More 
specifically, the majority of direct tests are conceptually-driven tests, that is, 
they rely on the conceptual and semantic processing of the items. Such is in 
accordance with several studies which have demonstrated that direct tests 
are sensitive to processing level manipulations, but highly insensitive to 
changes on superficial aspects of processing (i.e., modality) (e.g., Jacoby & 
Dallas, 1981). On the other hand, most indirect tests, on which perceptual 
information tends to be impaired, are data-driven tests, meaning that they 
strongly rely upon the perceptual and superficial processing of the stimuli. 
This converges with results showing that performance on indirect tests is 
sensitive to manipulations which affect the superficial aspects of 
information, but insensitive to changes on the conceptual processing level. 
 
What is the most suitable approach? 
Blaxton (1989) highlighted that an appropriate comparison between 
the two approaches has not been possible since the manipulations tended to 
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confound the type of system being used with the type of processing. In 
other words, direct tests are always guided conceptually (e.g., recognition 
and recall), whereas indirect tests are always data-driven (e.g., word 
completion and perceptual identification). Apart from these types of tests, 
Blaxton (1989) included a conceptually guided indirect test (general 
knowledge questions) and a data-driven direct test (graphemic cued recall). 
The results revealed a dissociation between the conceptually guided tests 
and the data-driven tests, irrespective of whether they were direct or 
indirect. It is thus possible to find dissociations, either between two indirect 
tests or between two direct tests, as long as one of them relies upon a more 
perceptual type of processing and the other upon a more conceptual type of 
processing. This pattern is difficult to explain within the systems approach, 
as it predicts that all indirect tests, and all direct tests as well, rely upon a 
single memory system (Squire, 1987).  
The systems approach could simply increase the number of postulated 
systems in order to accommodate the newly obtained dissociations. In fact, 
that has been done (see Schacter, 1990; Schacter et al., 1993; 1994; Squire, 
1994). For example, Schacter and Tulving (1994) proposed a taxonomy of 
five major memory systems: episodic memory, semantic memory, primary 
or working memory, procedural memory, and perceptual representation 
memory.  Some of these systems have subsystems (see Figure 1). For 
example, according to this account, the perceptual representation system 
(PRS), responsible for data-driven priming effects, is composed by three 
different subsystems: visual word form, structural description, and auditory 
word form. These three subsystems, in turn, can be further subdivided into a 
number of other subsystems (e.g., left-hemisphere and right-hemisphere 
subsystems, abstract and form-specific subsystems, see Schacter,1994)2. 
However, as several authors have pointed out, such segmentation seems 
contradictory with the very definition of memory system (Hintzman, 1990; 
Roediger, 1990; Roediger, 2003; Roediger et al., 1999).  Increasing the 
number of systems in an ad hoc fashion as a function of new discoveries is 
not appealing as it may render the theory irrefutable.  
However, it does not suffice to demonstrate that the systems approach 
has difficulties in making sense of certain patterns of data, it is also 
necessary to demonstrate that the processing approach is more capable of 
explaining them. In fact, the TAP approach predicts dissociations among 
different indirect tests (Blaxton, 1989), as long as one of them is data-driven 
and the other is conceptually guided. Moreover, the approach is able to 
explain dissociations between two implicit perceptual tests (Weldon & 
Roediger, 1987), assuming that the operations between the study and test 
phases can be similar to some extent, and depending on the test being 
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employed. Therefore, the dissociations between different memory tests, 
even if those tests are quite alike, can be seen as natural within a processing 
approach. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Taxonomy of memory systems proposed by Schacter and 
Tulving (from  Schacter & Tulving, 1994). 
 
 
Nevertheless, this approach has also been the target of some criticism 
(Kelley & Lindsay, 1996). The main problem is that numerous dissociations 
have been reported between tests which supposedly rely upon the same type 
of processing. Dissociations have been observed either between different 
implicit conceptual tests (Cabeza, 1994), or between different implicit 
perceptual tests (McDermott & Roediger, 1996; Weldon, 1991; Weldon & 
Coyote, 1996; Witherspoon & Moscovitch, 1989). Weldon (1991), for 
instance, showed that encoding in terms of meaning affects performance on 
the fragment completion test, but not on the perceptual identification task, 
two tests supposedly reliant upon a perceptual processing. Other studies 
(Toth & Hunt, 1990) have demonstrated that a perceptual variable (word 
spelling manipulation) affects performance on an explicit conceptual test, 
which is also not predicted by the TAP approach. Finally, there are tasks 
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which seem to be based on both perceptual and conceptual information, as 
is the case, for example, with the picture naming task (e.g., Cave & Squire, 
1992; Mitchell & Brown, 1988). Taken together, these results suggest that 
the conceptual-perceptual distinction is too broad to account for the 
differences in performance among the different memory tests.  
The difficulties above could possibly be overcome if the various types 
of processing, which influence our memory, are specified. The distinction 
between conceptual processing and perceptual processing is considered by 
some authors (Roediger et al., 1999) as an initial attempt at specifying the 
processes which are inherent to the functioning of memory. While that 
distinction has been able to accommodate several results in the literature, 
the theory could be improved. One avenue for such improvement focuses 
on the distinction among different types of conceptual and perceptive 
processing.  
On balance, an explanation of the different dissociations found in the 
literature has been done in terms of different systems or of different 
processes. Both approaches experience, however, some difficulty in 
understanding every extant data pattern. The processing alternative, though 
not devoid of problems, resorts to a smaller number of mechanisms in order 
to make sense of the data.  
In the last decades we have witnessed a decrease in the number of 
studies that directly address the debate between systems and processes. 
Recent studies have been marked, however, by the expansion of the 
neuroscience approach. The recent developments in neuroimaging 
techniques have led to a proliferation of studies which investigate the neural 
mechanisms of explicit and implicit memory. We will now briefly 
summarize this research and discuss its implications for the debate about the 
underlying mechanisms of explicit and implicit memory.      
 
Neuropsychology and neuroimaging findings 
To a great extent, the debate about the nature of implicit and explicit 
memory was stimulated by neuroscience findings, in particular by studies of 
amnesiac patients. These patients provide unique opportunities for 
exploring the relation between damages in specific brain regions and the 
loss of certain memory functions. The most important case study in the 
neuroscience of memory literature is probably the one of the patient H.M., 
who had most of the bilateral medial temporal lobe (MTL) removed as part 
of a surgery to treat epilepsy. However, despite severely amnesic, H. M. 
was still able to acquire new motor skills (Milner, Corkin, & Teuber, 1968; 
Scoville & Milner, 1957). This case was revolutionary in the field because 
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it seemed contrary to the prevailing view that mental functions, such as 
memory, were too complex to be localized in the brain.  
Since this initial study, several other cases of amnesiac patients, with 
lesions in the MTL, and related explicit memory deficits, have been 
reported (Insausti, Annese, Amaral, & Squire, 2013; Rempel-Clower, Zola, 
Squire, & Amaral, 1996; Smith, Urgolites, Hopkins, & Squire, 2013). These 
studies led to the dominant idea that regions in the MTL, and, in particular, 
the hippocampus, are specifically involved in explicit or declarative 
memory. Recent experiments that have made use of brain imaging 
techniques lend support to this notion (Davachi, Mitchell, & Wagner, 2003; 
Nyberg, McIntosh, Houle, Nilsson, & Tulving, 1996; Schacter & Wagner 
1999; cf. Shallice et al., 1994). In addition, the hippocampus was found to 
be critical to the recollection component of memory, but not to familiarity 
(Eichenbaum, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Eldridge, Knowlton, 
Furmanski, Brookheimer, & Engel, 2000; cf. Eichenbaum et al., 2007; 
Manns, Hopkins, Reed, Kitchener, & Squire, 2003).  
A common thesis concerning the specific mechanisms involved in 
declarative episodic encoding is that MTL regions surrounding the 
hippocampus (namely the parahippocampal and entorhinal cortex) receive 
sensorial information from different areas of the cortex. This information 
converges in the hippocampus, which has an essential role in binding and 
relating the different components together (Eichenbaum, 2001; Cohen, 
Ryan, Hunt, Romine, Wszalek, & Nash, 1999). At retrieval, the 
hippocampus is assumed to enable episodic holistic retrieval through pattern 
completion (Horner, Bisby, Bush, Lin, & Burgess, 2015; Preston & 
Eichenbaum, 2013).  
While it is consensual that MTL is involved in explicit memory, other 
areas of the brain (namely, the ones which are not damaged in amnesiacs) 
would subserve implicit memory. At this level, studies have suggested that 
different neural structures are particularly central to different forms of 
implicit memory. For example, the neostriatum and basal ganglia for habit 
learning (Knowlton, Mangels, & Squire, 1996; Yin & Knowlton, 2006), 
prefrontal regions for conceptual priming (Dobbins, Schnyer, Verfaellie, & 
Schacter, 2004; Maccota & Buckner, 2004; Wig, Grafton, Demos, & 
Kelley, 2005), the occipital lobe for perceptual priming (Gong et al., 2016; 
Keane, Gabrieli, Mapstone, Johnson, & Corkin, 1995), and the amygdala 
for fear and emotional learning (Bechara et al., 1995; Johansen et al., 2010; 
Orsini & Maren, 2012).  
 Recent research suggests, however, that the dichotomy explicit 
memory-MTL versus implicit memory-non MTL is probably too simplistic. 
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For example, some studies have reported cases of amnesiacs who showed 
impairments in implicit memory tasks (Addante, 2015; Butters, Heindel, & 
Salmon, 1990; Chun & Phelps, 1999; Duss et. al., 2014). In addition, 
neuroimaging studies have provided evidence that the hippocampus is 
recruited during implicit relational tasks (Reber, Luechinger, Boesiger, & 
Henke, 2012; Ryals, Wang, Polnaszek, & Voss, 2015; for  reviews see 
Hannula & Greene, 2012; Henke, 2010). These results indicate that the 
hippocampus is important for both direct and indirect relational memory 
tasks, which contradicts the notion that the hippocampus is exclusively 
involved in explicit memory.  
Additionally, despite the prevailing view that the MTL underlies 
explicit memory, studies have been reported which show that some forms of 
declarative memory are independent of the activation of the hippocampus. 
For example, semantic memory can be preserved in patients with damage to 
the hippocampus (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). Indeed, there is now good 
evidence that other areas, besides the hippocampus, are also important for 
declarative memory, such as the diencephalic midline (Squire & Wixted, 
2011) and, in particular, the prefrontal cortex (Simons & Spiers, 2003). The 
important role of the prefrontal cortex on reducing interference 
(Shimamura, Jurica, Mangels, Gershberg, & Knight, 1995) suggests that the 
communication between the hippocampus and the prefrontal cortex has a 
critical role in the retrieval of specific memories. The mechanisms through 
which these two systems interact during the encoding and retrieval of 
episodic memories are still not fully understood and have thus been a 
subject of current research (Preston & Eichenbaum, 2013; Schlichting & 
Preston, 2015). 
Neuroscience studies have made valuable contributions to the 
understanding of the neural structure of memory. However, it has now 
become apparent that memory functions involve complex interactions 
between different cortical areas. Thus, instead of associating self-contained 
areas with certain functions, the current focus of neuroscience research has 
been on exploring the neural networks involved in different memory 
functions. It should be noted that the interpretation of the data with 
amnesiac patients may be fallacious. Of course, the fact that a lesion in a 
brain area X leads to the loss of a function, does not imply that X is the only 
area involved in that function, and not even that X is central to that function 
(Andrewes, 2003). 
Another important aspect concerning neuropsychological data is 
related to the great plasticity of the brain. Patients may function in a 
qualitatively different manner than they used to before sustaining the 
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lesions. For example, some studies have found that patients with brain 
injuries may perform better on certain indirect tasks than normal control 
subjects (see Kapur, 1996) – the so-called paradoxical facilitation effect. In 
addition, Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997) reported cases of patients with 
hippocampus lesions, and with loss of episodic memory, but unimpaired 
semantic memory. Since it is usually assumed that semantic knowledge is 
acquired through the accumulation of episodic memories, the authors put 
forward the possibility that other neuronal routes are being used to store 
semantic memories. These results suggest that patients and controls may use 
different processes to perform the same tasks. Thus, a convergence of 
methods is desirable. 
But what do the neuroscience data tell us about the debate regarding 
the processes involved in explicit and implicit memory? The most important 
aspect is that the results counter a unitary view of memory. The traditional 
idea that two broad memory systems (declarative and non-declarative) 
underlie explicit and implicit memory doesn’t seem to be supported by the 
data. For example, implicit memory not only involves different neuronal 
areas, depending on the type of indirect task, but may also depend on areas 
typically associated with conscious uses of memory, such as the 
hippocampus (Addante, 2015). This supports the notion that there needs to 
be a specification of the mental processes involved, and that dissociations 
can occur between processes, and not necessarily between levels of 
consciousness. 
Most of the neuroscience studies are restricted at a structural and 
physiological level of analysis, and few of them have used the data as a way 
of contrasting alternative psychological theories. This is unfortunate. In 
fact, despite the skepticism regarding the utility of neuroscience to explain 
the mind (Henson, 2006), it is at present unquestionable that the data from 
neuropsychology and functional neuroimaging can constitute important 
tools to inform cognitive theories (Cooper & Shallice, 2011; Hutzler, 2014). 
For example, if one assumes that a specific brain region is important to a 
certain function, one can test to what extent that area is activated in different 
types of memory tests. At the same time, that would allow one to predict 
that patients who have sustained lesions in those regions will probably lose 
that type of processing capacity.  
Note also that, as the systems and processing theoretical approaches 
develop in order to explain the extant data, it is natural that they will 
become less and less incompatible and that the distinction between them 
will fade. An adequate system theory, that is, a sufficiently explanatory one, 
will have to specify the computational characteristics of each system. On 
 T. Ramos, et al. 378
the other hand, it is plausible to assume that the same processes are 
consistently based on specific neural networks. This is in line with 
Tulving’s argument that the opposition between “processes” and “systems” 
is false (Tulving, 1999).  Such considerations open the possibility of an 
integrative approach (Cabeza & Moscovitch, 2013; Schacter, 1992).   
Still, some authors question whether complex mental processes can 
ever be adequately mapped onto the brain (Coltheart, 2006; Uttal, 2001). 
The possibility of a neural mapping of the memory processes will probably 
be contingent upon how sophisticated the imaging techniques become, and 
how precise those techniques are at the cellular level. The advancements in 
the imaging techniques over the last few years have been remarkable, and 
their potential application for treating degenerative memory diseased is 
certainly desirable (see Lisman, 2015; Chang, 2015), but this is an area 
which is still in its infancy. 
 
Questions, controversies, and debates 
To conclude, we will now consider two critical debates in the 
literature: the contamination problem, and the discussion about the use of 
dissociations as a tool to reveal the architecture of the mind and brain.  
 
The assumption of transparency and the issue of contamination.  
Research on implicit memory has faced some critical methodological 
problems, one of which being the contamination problem. The majority of 
the research on unconscious influences on memory has assumed the 
existence of a direct correspondence between processes and tasks. More 
specifically, implicit processes are typically equated with performance on 
indirect tests, whereas explicit processes are paired with performance on 
direct tests. However, this approach is susceptible to contamination 
problems. It is not appropriate to equate processes with tasks. Conscious 
processes can contaminate performance on indirect tests. If participants 
realize that the stimuli used in the indirect test are part of a previous 
learning stage, they may employ conscious and deliberate recollection 
strategies, which would turn a test, meant to be implicit, into an explicit 
one. Conversely, unconscious processes can also contribute to performance 
on direct tests (Jacoby, 1991; Sheldon & Moscovitch, 2010). It has been 
shown, for instance, that the performance on the recognition test depends on 
an implicit memory component (Yonelinas, 2002). Understandably, calling 
a memory test “implicit” does not assure that the participant relies only on 
unconscious memory processes to complete it, and such a designation could 
be misleading in scientific communication.  
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 Having become aware of this problem, researchers have developed 
different ways of trying to avoid it, such as presenting the indirect test as 
one of several distractor tasks, testing only a small number of previously 
studied stimuli, or encouraging rapid responses (see MacLeod, 2008). All 
these procedures aim to prevent participants from noticing the connection 
between the study and test stages, and to decrease the likelihood of their 
using explicit recall strategies. Nonetheless, even if such methods succeed 
in making the study/test relationship more inconspicuous, they are not a 
guarantee that the participants will not become aware of the relationship. 
An alternative consists of simply asking participants at the end of the 
experiment if they became aware of the relationship between the study and 
the test phases, and if they employed conscious recollection strategies 
during the completion of the indirect test (Bowers & Schacter, 1990). Such 
an alternative is, however, susceptible to the typical problems of self-report 
measures. Some participants may say that they were not aware of any 
relationship, even if they truly were, while others may report awareness in 
its absence, simply to confirm, or disconfirm, the experimenters’ 
expectations. What is more, self-report measures, being employed at the end 
of the experiment, do not allow one to study the level of awareness 
pertaining to each studied stimulus. 
 Jacoby (1991) developed a method, the process dissociation 
procedure (PDP), which aims to deal with the contamination issue. The 
PDP (Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby & Kelley, 1992; Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 
1993) stems from the notion that most memory operations reflect a joint 
contribution of conscious and unconscious processes. Therefore, more 
important than developing pure tests is finding ways to separate the 
contribution of both types of processes in a given task. 
 By applying the PDP, the contribution of conscious and unconscious 
processes can be measured by comparing the results pertaining to two 
conditions named Inclusion and Exclusion. In the Inclusion condition, the 
conscious and unconscious influences act in the same direction, leading to 
the same response. In the Exclusion condition, the conscious and 
unconscious influences act in opposite ways, thus leading to contrary 
responses. It follows from this that the difference between the Inclusion and 
the Exclusion conditions provides researchers with a measure of the 
contribution of the conscious processes. Through elementary algebra, and 
assuming independence between the two processes, a mathematical estimate 
of the contribution of conscious and unconscious processes for the task can 
be obtained.  
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The main criticism of the PDP has to do with the independence 
assumption. It has been shown that this assumption can be violated under 
different circumstances (Curran & Hintzman, 1995), which places some 
limits on the applicability of the PDP approach. These criticisms have led to 
an intense debate (Hintzman & Curran, 1997; Jacoby, 1998; Jacoby & 
Shrout, 1997; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012). At the same time, several 
adaptations and extensions of the PDP have been formulated in order to 
deal with the potential violations of its assumptions (Buchner, Erdfelder, & 
Vaterrodt-Plünnecke, 1995; Klauer, Dittrich, Scholtes, & Voss, 2015; 
Vaterrodt-Plünnecke, Krüger, & Bredenkamp, 2002). Despite its potential 
limitations, the fact that the PDP is a simple, yet powerful, tool might 
explain why it continues to be so widely applied across a number of 
different domains (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, 
Sherman, & Sherman, 2006; Shimizu, Lee, & Uleman, 2017). 
As an alternative to PDP, several other multinomial processing tree 
(MPT) models have been proposed, such as the QUAD model (Conrey, 
Sherman, Gawronski, Hungenberg, & Groom, 2005), the conjoint 
recognition model (Brainerd, Reyna, & Mojardin, 1999), or the ABC model 
(Stahl & Degner, 2007). MPT models employ a greater number of 
parameters to estimate the independent contributions of the latent 
psychological processes underlying a particular task. Multinomial models 
are represented in a tree structure, and each branch of the tree represents a 
process, or a sequence of processes, which can be followed when 
performing a given task. Each path results in a response category (i.e., the 
terminal nodes of the tree). MPT models allow one to test how well the 
model fits the data, and to mathematically estimate the contributions of the 
different processes towards performance on the task. 
One example of an MPT model is the conjoint recognition model 
(Brainerd et al., 1999), which is described by the authors as a second-
generation model derived from the PDP procedure. The conjoint 
recognition model was primarily applied to recognition tests with three 
types of items (targets, related lures, and unrelated lures). In addition, 
besides the typical inclusion and exclusion instructions, a third type of 
instruction is also included (i.e, recognize only related lures). One of the 
major merits of the model is the possibility of estimating a response bias 
parameter. Brainerd et al. (1999) used the model to separate verbatim 
memory (i.e., item-specific information, usually associated with explicit 
recollection) and gist memory (i.e., the general meaning, often associated 
with a feeling of familiarity). More recently, Stahl and Klauer (2008) 
suggested a simplified version of the conjoint recognition procedure.  
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Another MPT model which was also largely influenced by the PDP is 
the Quadruple (QUAD) process model. The QUAD model allows the 
estimation of the contribution of four processes which are assumed to 
influence performance on implicit tasks: two processes with controlled 
features (detection and overcoming bias) and two largely automatic 
processes (guessing and association activation). The QUAD model has 
often been applied to different tasks in the social domain, including the 
implicit association task (IAT, Conrey et al., 2005; for a review see 
Sherman, 2008). 
The employment of MPT models (see Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; 
Payne & Bishara, 2009) has the advantage of requiring a psychological 
theory which makes explicit the underlying cognitive processes and 
assumptions. The application of these models has been met with success in 
various areas (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999). Despite the popularity of the 
MPT models, they are usually restricted to a particular paradigm, are 
necessarily mathematical simplifications of the mechanisms involved in a 
given task, and are not always easily integrated within more general 
psychological models.  
 In sum, the approach which matches processes to tasks, treating the 
latter as if they were pure, is theoretically and empirically limited. 
Multinomial models are an example of an approach which allows us not to 
restrict ourselves to studying the conscious and unconscious influences in 
separate tasks, but that instead permits us to explore tasks in which multiple 
processes contribute to performance, a situation which should be more the 
norm than the exception.  
 
What reveals a dissociation?  
Dissociations have been the main empirical criterion to establish the 
existence of different memory systems or processes. However, the role of 
dissociation in modelling theoretical knowledge has been highly debated.  
Regarding this matter, Dunn and Kirsner (2003) refer that:  
(…) since any two tasks, different enough to be called different, 
cannot recruit exactly the same mental functions in exactly the same 
way, it is inevitable that they will eventually yield a dissociation (…) 
such fractionations call into question the utility of dissociations as 
they seem to suggest that we will eventually need as many mental 
functions or modules or systems as there are tasks to humans to do 
(Dunn & Kirsner, 2003, p. 5). 
In line with this view, numerous authors state that dissociations do not 
suffice to establish the existence of two memory systems or processes (e.g., 
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Bedford, 2003; Chater, 2003; Karmiloff-Smith, Scerif, & Ansari, 2003; 
McCloskey, 2003; Reingold, 2003). For instance, in the case of a simple 
dissociation what happens is that task A is affected by some manipulation 
or brain lesion, while task B is not. It is therefore concluded that there is an 
underlying process to task A which is not present in task B. However, an 
alternative interpretation is that task B is simply easier or less reliable 
(Buchner & Wippich, 2000; Meier & Perrig, 2000) and that is why 
performance remains unaffected. 
 Another type of dissociation is the double dissociation. In this case, 
there is another variable or lesion which affects task B without exerting any 
effect on task A. This is a stronger kind of dissociation. Nonetheless, since a 
double dissociation is not more than the result of two simple dissociations, 
it may be explained by the same alternative account as above. Task A could 
be dependent upon a greater degree of a given process X, and that does not 
necessarily mean that said process cannot, or will not, affect task B. On the 
other hand, task B could require the presence of any given process Y in a 
greater degree than task A. Another alternative explanation is that both 
tasks rely upon the same processes, but in a reverse way, that is: process X 
facilitates a task and interferes with the other, and vice-versa for process Y 
(Dunn & Kirsner, 1988). In fact, it is possible to simulate double 
dissociations in single-system models (Juola & Plunkett, 2000; Kinder & 
Shanks, 2003). The essential aspect is that the presence of dissociations can 
be indicative, but does not constitute irrefutable evidence, that multiple 
processes exist. 
 In an endeavor to circumvent this issue, Dunn and Kirsner (1988) 
suggest the use of reverse associations. These authors call the attention to 
the fact that a uniprocessing explanation requires that the performance in a 
task be a monotonic function of the performance in another. Therefore, the 
only way of showing the existence of two processes is by means of reverse 
associations, that is: it is necessary that a variable affects two tasks in the 
same way, and that another variable has opposite effects on the two tasks. 
Such a pattern would suggest a non-monotonic relationship between the 
performance on both tasks, which would be incompatible with a single 
processing vision. 
 More recently, several authors have proposed the use of a “state 
trait” (STA) analysis as a way of determining the number of processes, or 
latent variables, underlying a set of data which derives from the 
manipulation of two or more independent variables on two or more 
dependent variables (Dunn, Kalish, & Newell, 2014; Newell & Dunn, 
2008). STA allows one to understand in what way the set of data is 
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mediated by a single latent process (a single curve), or by more than one 
latent process (more than one curve). This type of analysis has been applied 
in a wide variety of fields (see Prince, Brown, & Heathcote, 2012), although 
its ability to differentiate between single processing and multiple processing 
visions has also been called into question (Ashby, 2014).  
 
Final Remarks 
Implicit memory is a fascinating topic. The study of implicit memory 
opens the door to the understanding of the deepest origin of our behavior 
and it requires addressing fundamental questions about the nature of the 
mind, such as the issue of the correspondence between mind and brain.  
The two main approaches employed to explain the dissociations 
between direct and indirect tests, the system approach and the processing 
approach, both struggle to understand all data. Yet, while a processing 
theory can be assessed regardless of assumptions pertaining to brain 
location, the reverse, that is, a systems theory in the absence of an 
information processing theory, is insufficient. Thus, it is essential to go 
beyond a topography of brain regions, and define the computational 
principles which govern each memory system, their level of specialization 
or selectivity, as well as how different systems interact with each other. We 
should note that it may well be the case that the concept of memory system 
is, above all, a tool with heuristic value to generate hypotheses about 
patterns of dissociations.  If so, despite its empirical merit, the concept 
should neither replace, nor obscure, the investigation of the rules of 
operation that govern mental functions.  A challenge for future research is 
to stimulate a greater interaction between the psychological and the 
neuroscience perspectives. While we are certainly dealing with two 
different levels of analysis, a thorough explanation of how memory works 
should cross neuropsychology, neuroimaging, and behavioral data. 
 Analyzing the literature reveals that the distinction between implicit 
and explicit memory is clearly an insufficient dichotomy. It is necessary to 
go beyond it and specify which processes are common or different among 
tasks. For example, let us consider two memory tasks: word completion and 
perceptual identification. Although the two are perceived as being implicit, 
they certainly differ in various aspects. It is likely that they share certain 
subprocesses, but that they diverge on others, and may therefore be affected 
similarly, or differently, as a function of distinct variables. It is then likely 
that high-level theories, which postulate general memory principles, may 
feel the need to encompass auxiliary “task theories” (Garcia-Marques & 
Ferreira, 2011). 
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 In the present paper we highlighted some central problems in this 
literature, such as equating tasks with processes, and the issue of 
dissociations not constituting either a sufficient, or a necessary, criterion to 
establish the existence of multiple memory processes or systems. These 
questions are not always fully considered in the literature, but ignoring them 
prevents the development of new theoretical and methodological 
alternatives to study implicit and explicit memory influences. With regard 
to the first problem, there are techniques which allow the dissociation of the 
contributions of different processes on a certain task. These techniques, 
such as the PDP (Jacoby, 1991), have been refined and extended in recent 
years (Klauer et al., 2015). With regard to the second issue, given the 
ambiguity of the dissociations, they should be used in a convergent way 
with other tools – imaging data and state trait analyses, for instance – to 
draw conclusions about the number of the underlying processes in a specific 
action. The more single processing and multiple processing models are 
compared in their ability to generate specific predictions regarding different 
patterns of data, the bigger the theoretical development will be. 
 It should be noted that the study of implicit memory is present 
across several other domains. In fact, implicit memory underlies many other 
cognitive processes, such as learning, categorization, language, and decision 
making. In these cases, existing models may be adjusted to incorporate 
implicit memory effects. A case in point is the counter model proposed by 
Ratclliff and McKoon (1997) which is based on the logogen model of word 
identification (Morton, 1969). The authors use this model in order to 
explain the implicit memory effects on the perceptual identification task, as 
an intrinsic part of the word identification process. 
 The concept of implicit memory may be too broad, which could 
compromise its theoretical usefulness. It is likely that the majority of our 
behavior relies much more on implicit, rather than explicit, memory 
influences. Implicit memory seems to be present in almost all of our 
actions, in most of what we do. Children use it considerably more, 
constantly. As Lockhart (1989, p.6) points out: “Why else should we be 
impressed by the fact that a response to a current stimulus can be 
influenced by a past event of which the subject is unaware? Isn’t that how 
most organisms behave most of the time…”. It seems that the explicit 
recollection of past events as an end in itself is the exception, and not the 
other way around. So, critics may argue that the concept of implicit memory 
is misleading, or scientifically damaging, because it encompasses 
phenomena that can only be understood in a fragmented way, and as a 
function of the different tasks and contents. Nevertheless, if the scientific 
merit of a construct is measured by the number of questions and hypotheses 
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it has generated, and by the amount of empirical discoveries it has 
promoted, then the relevance of the implicit memory construct becomes 
unquestionable. Major breakthroughs have been made which have helped us 
to better understand how memory works in different tasks, and under 
different conditions. These discoveries have intrinsic value (Garcia-
Marques & Ferreira, 2011) and restrict the development of any 
comprehensive theory of memory.  
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